A.M. No. CA-05-20-P; September 9, 2005
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-81-CA-P)
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DELILAH VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS, COURT OF APPEALS, Complainant,*
vs.CIELITO M. SALUD, CLERK IV, COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
vs.CIELITO M. SALUD, CLERK IV, COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
Facts:
Melchor Lagua was found guilty of homicide. On appeal, Lagua filed a Very Urgent Petition for Bail. Finding the petition well-taken, the appellate court issued a Resolution on October 9, 2003, directing him to post a P200,000.00 bond.
Lagua’s bond was approved and the appellate court also directed the issuance of an order of release in favor of Lagua. The resolution was then brought to the Office of the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Maria Isabel M. Pattugalan-Madarang, for promulgation.
Irma Del Rosario, Utility Worker, noticed the respondent’s unusual interest in the Lagua case. The respondent had apparently been making inquiries whether the appellate court had already directed the issuance of an order of release in the said case and was initially told there was none yet.
On November 7, 2003, the respondent went to the National Penitentiary to serve the resolution and order of release in the Lagua case.
In the meantime, Atty. Madarang received a telephone call from a certain Melissa Melchor, who introduced herself as Lagua’s relative. The caller asked her how much more they had to give to facilitate Lagua’s provisional liberty. The caller also told Atty. Madarang that they had sought the help of a certain Rhodora Valdez of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, where the criminal case originated, but were told that they still had a balance to be given to Justice Magtolis and Atty. Madarang through the respondent. Atty. Madarang then called the said court and asked to speak to Ms. Valdez, pretending to be Lagua’s relative. Ms. Valdez was not in the office that time. What followed next were exchanges of text messages with the respondent.
On November 11, 2003, Justice Magtolis called the respondent to her office. When confronted, the respondent denied extorting or receiving money for Lagua’s release, or in any other case.
Justice Magtolis lodged the complaint against the respondent in a Letter dated November 14, 2003, containing, among others, the following allegations:
The delivery of resolutions/orders to unauthorized persons and "complete strangers" who promised to "take care thereof" ("siya na raw ang bahala") constitutes not only neglect of duty but also conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Staying for the whole day within the vicinity of the National Bilibid Prisons to the point of failing to fulfill his other duties for the day constitutes inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties. On the other hand, the use of my name and that of our Division Clerk of Court to illegally solicit financial or material benefit from parties with pending cases before this Court is illegal per se.
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully requested that Cielito Salud be subjected to an administrative investigation and disciplinary action.
In his counter-affidavit, the respondent vehemently denied the charges. He never demanded money from Lagua’s relative; his name had been used by someone and was, thus, a mere victim of the circumstances. Moreover, the fact that he immediately released the CA order in question was clear proof that he had no financial interest in the transaction. In addition, respondent claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against him constitutes a violation of his right to privacy.
Issue:
Whetehr or not that the admission of the text messages as evidence against Cielito Salud constitutes a violation of his right to privacy
Ruling:
The respondent’s claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against him constitutes a violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been classified as "ephemeral electronic communication" under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and "shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof." Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that he was the sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarang’s cell phone.
This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao. In that case, the Court, in finding the respondent therein guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, considered text messages addressed to the complainant asking for a million pesos in exchange for a favorable decision in a case pending before the CA. The Court had the occasion to state:
… The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which provides:
"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages … and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained."
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the [said rules], "Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof … ." In this case, complainant who was the recipient of the said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.
G.R. No. 193531; December 14, 2011
ELLERY MARCH G. TORRES, Petitioner,
vs.PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION, represented by ATTY. CARLOS R. BAUTISTA, JR.,Respondent.
vs.PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION, represented by ATTY. CARLOS R. BAUTISTA, JR.,Respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) of respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). On the basis of an alleged intelligence report of padding of the Credit Meter Readings (CMR) of the slot machines at PAGCOR-Hyatt Manila, then Casino Filipino-Hyatt (CF Hyatt), which involved the slot machine and internal security personnel of respondent PAGCOR, and in connivance with slot machine customers, respondent PAGCOR's Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) allegedly conducted an investigation to verify the veracity of such report. The CIU discovered the scheme of CMR padding which was committed by adding zero after the first digit of the actual CMR of a slot machine or adding a digit before the first digit of the actual CMR, e.g., a slot machine with an actual CMR of P5,000.00 will be issued a CMR receipt with the amount of eitherP50,000.00 or P35,000.00. Based on the CIU's investigation of all the CMR receipts and slot machine jackpot slips issued by CF Hyatt for the months of February and March 2007, the CIU identified the members of the syndicate who were responsible for such CMR padding, which included herein petitioner.
On May 4, 2007, the CIU served petitioner with a Memorandum of Charges7 for dishonesty, serious misconduct, fraud and violation of office rules and regulations which were considered grave offenses where the penalty imposable is dismissal.
On the same day, another Memorandum of Charges signed by Rogelio Y. Bangsil, Jr., Senior Branch Manager, CF Hyatt Manila, was issued to petitioner informing him of the charge of dishonesty (padding of anomalous SM jackpot receipts).
On August 4, 2007, petitioner received a letter dismissing him from the service.
On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint against PAGCOR and its Chairman Efraim Genuino for illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other benefits.
Respondent PAGCOR filed its Comment wherein it alleged, among others, that petitioner failed to perfect an appeal within the period and manner provided by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Law.
On June 23, 2008, the CSC, treating petitioner's complaint as an appeal from the PAGCOR's decision dismissing petitioner from the service, issued Resolution No. 081204 denying petitioner's appeal.
In so ruling, the CSC found that the issue for resolution was whether petitioner's appeal had already prescribed which the former answered in the positive. The CSC did not give credit to petitioner's claim that he sent a facsimile transmission of his letter reconsideration within the period prescribed by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
Petitioner's motion for a reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court but was dismissed.
In dismissing the petition, the CA found that petitioner failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that he had filed a motion for reconsideration. It found insufficient to merit consideration petitioner's claim that he had sent through a facsimile transmission a letter/reconsideration dated August 13, 2007 addressed to PAGCOR's Chairman, members of the Board of Directors and the Merit Systems Protection Board; that assuming arguendo that a letter reconsideration was indeed sent through a facsimile transmission, such facsimile transmission is inadmissible as electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s submission of a letter reconsideration of his dismissal by means of a facsimile transmission which was within the 15 day period for filing an appeal should have tolled the period to appeal
Ruling:
Petitioner contends that he filed his letter reconsideration of his dismissal16 on August 13, 2007, which was within the 15-day period for filing the same; and that he did so by means of a facsimile transmission sent to the PAGCOR's Office of the Board of Directors. He claims that the sending of documents thru electronic data message, which includes facsimile, is sanctioned under Republic Act No. 8792, the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. Petitioner further contends that since his letter reconsideration was not acted upon by PAGCOR, he then filed his complaint before the CSC.
We are not persuaded.
Sections 37, 38, 39, and 43 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which are applicable to this case, respectively provide, to wit:
Section 37. Finality of Decisions - A decision rendered by heads of agencies whereby a penalty of suspension for not more than thirty days or a fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days' salary is imposed, shall be final and executory. However, if the penalty imposed is suspension exceeding thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, the same shall be final and executory after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal and no such pleading has been filed.
Section 38. Filing of motion for reconsideration. - The party adversely affected by the decision may file a motion for reconsideration with the disciplining authority who rendered the same within fifteen days from receipt thereof.
Section 39. When deemed filed. - A motion for reconsideration sent by mail shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the postmark on the envelope which shall be attached to the records of the case and in case of personal delivery, the date stamped thereon by the proper office.
Section 43. Filing of Appeals. - Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty (30) days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days’ salary, maybe appealed to the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
Clearly, a motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or personal delivery. When a motion for reconsideration was sent by mail, the same shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the postmark on the envelope which shall be attached to the records of the case. On the other hand, in case of personal delivery, the motion is deemed filed on the date stamped thereon by the proper office. And the movant has 15 days from receipt of the decision within which to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal therefrom.
Petitioner received a copy of the letter/notice of dismissal on August 4, 2007; thus, the motion for reconsideration should have been submitted either by mail or by personal delivery on or before August 19, 2007. However, records do not show that petitioner had filed his motion for reconsideration. In fact, the CSC found that the non-receipt of petitioner's letter reconsideration was duly supported by certifications issued by PAGCOR employees.
Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter reconsideration which he claims was sent through a facsimile transmission, such letter reconsideration did not toll the period to appeal. The mode used by petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As we stated earlier, the motion for reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery.
In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., we found inadmissible in evidence the filing of pleadings through fax machines and ruled that:
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile.
x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. x x x
Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, We determined the question of whether the original facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act, and We said:
We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
A.M. No. CA-05-18-P; April 12, 2005
ZALDY NUEZ, Complainant,
vs.ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO, respondent.
vs.ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO, respondent.
Facts:
This is an administrative case for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against Elvira Cruz-Apao (Respondent), Executive Assistant II of the Acting Division Clerk of Court of the Fifteenth (15th) Division, Court of Appeals (CA). The complaint arose out of respondent’s solicitation of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from Zaldy Nuez (Complainant) in exchange for a speedy and favorable decision of the latter’s pending case in the CA. Complainant initially lodged a complaint with the Action Center of the Television program Imbestigador of GMA Network, the crew of which had accompanied him to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commission–Special Projects Group (PAOCC-SPG) in Malacañang where he filed a complaint for extortion against respondent. This led to the conduct of an entrapment operation.
The Committee conducted an investigation of the case where it concluded that a prima facie case of Dishonesty and Serious Misconduct against respondent existed.
Complainant’s case referred to above had been pending with the CA for more than two years. Complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against PAGCOR before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC ordered complainant’s reinstatement but a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order was issued by the CA in favor of PAGCOR, thus complainant was not reinstated to his former job pending adjudication of the case. Desiring an expeditious decision of his case, complainant sought the assistance of respondent sometime in July 2004 after learning of the latter’s employment with the CA from her sister, Magdalena David. During their first telephone conversation and thereafter through a series of messages they exchanged via SMS, complainant informed respondent of the particulars of his pending case. Allegedly, complainant thought that respondent would be able to advise him on how to achieve an early resolution of his case.
However, a week after their first telephone conversation, respondent allegedly told complainant that a favorable and speedy decision of his case was attainable but the person who was to draft the decision was in return asking for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
Complainant then asked for time to determine whether or not to pay the money in exchange for the decision. Instead, in August of 2004, he sought the assistance of Imbestigador. The crew of the TV program accompanied him to PAOCCF-SPG where he lodged a complaint against respondent for extortion. Thereafter, he communicated with respondent again to verify if the latter was still asking for the money and to set up a meeting with her. Upon learning that respondent’s offer of a favorable decision in exchange for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was still standing, the plan for the entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigador in cooperation with the PAOCC.
On 24 September 2004, complainant and respondent met for the first time in person at the 2 Floor of Jollibee, Times Plaza Bldg., the place where the entrapment operation was later conducted. Patricia Siringan (Siringan), a researcher of Imbestigador, accompanied complainant and posed as his sister-in-law. During the meeting, complainant clarified from respondent that if he gave the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), he would get a favorable decision. This was confirmed by the latter together with the assurance that it would take about a month for the decision to come out. Respondent also explained that the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) guaranteed a favorable decision only in the CA but did not extend to the Supreme Court should the case be appealed later.
Complainant tried once again to bargain for a lower amount during the meeting but respondent asserted that the amount was fixed. The parties set the next meeting date at lunchtime on 28 September 2004 and it was understood that the money would be handed over by complainant to respondent then.
Respondent arrived at around 1:00 p.m. She appeared very nervous and suspicious during the meeting. When respondent finally touched the unsealed envelope to look at the money inside, the PAOCTF agents converged on her and invited her to the Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters at United Nations Avenue for questioning. She was tested and found positive for ultra-violet powder that was previously dusted on the money.
Issue:
Whether or not text messages can be admissible in evidence to support the claim of the complainant
Ruling:
Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages from respondent duly presented before the Committee that the latter asked for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision of the former’s pending case with the CA. The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides:
"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained."
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . ." In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant.
G.R. No. 170491; April 4, 2007
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC of Cebu, Br. 19, BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, and WALLEM SHIPPING, INCORPORATED, Respondents.
vs.HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC of Cebu, Br. 19, BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, and WALLEM SHIPPING, INCORPORATED, Respondents.
Facts:
On 20 April 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and damaged petitioner’s Power Barge 209 which was then moored at the Cebu International Port. Thus, on 26 April 1996, petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against private respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for the alleged damages caused on petitioner’s power barges.
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal offer of evidence before the lower court on 2 February 2004 consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V" together with the sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently, private respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed their respective objections to petitioner’s formal offer of evidence.
On 16 November 2004, public respondent judge issued the assailed order denying the admission and excluding from the records petitioner’s Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, "R" and "S" and its sub-markings.
The Court finds merit in the objections raised and the motion to strike out filed respectively by the defendants. The record shows that the plaintiff has been given every opportunity to present the originals of the Xerox or photocopies of the documents it offered. It never produced the originals. The plaintiff attempted to justify the admission of the photocopies by contending that "the photocopies offered are equivalent to the original of the document" on the basis of the Electronic Evidence. But as rightly pointed out in defendant Wallem’s Reply to the Comment of Plaintiff, the Xerox copies do not constitute the electronic evidence defined in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
"(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For the purpose of these Rules, the term "electronic document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data message".
The information in those Xerox or photocopies was not received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically. Moreover, such electronic evidence must be authenticated (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 5, Rules on Electronic Evidence), which the plaintiff failed to do. Finally, the required Affidavit to prove the admissibility and evidentiary weight of the alleged electronic evidence (Sec. 1, Rule 9, Ibid) was not executed, much less presented in evidence.
Upon denial of petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated 20 April 2005, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals. On 9 November 2005, the appellate court issued a Decision dismissing petitioner’s petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the photocopies that the petitioner in this case offered as formal evidence are the functional equivalent of their original based on its inimitable interpretation of the Rules on ElectronicEvidence
Ruling:
an "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document.
The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a person’s signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.
When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper place or places. However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was made in accordance with the exceptions as enumerated under the abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the court a quo denying admissibility of the photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary evidence.
G.R. No. 170633; October 17, 2007
MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.SSANGYONG CORPORATION, respondents.
vs.SSANGYONG CORPORATION, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with office at Binondo, Manila, is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong), an international trading company with head office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions.
On April 13, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office sent, by fax, a letter addressed to Gregory Chan, MCC Manager [also the President of Sanyo Seiki Stainless Steel Corporation], to confirm MCC's and Sanyo Seiki's order of 220 metric tons (MT) of hot rolled stainless steel. Chan, on behalf of the corporations, assented and affixed his signature on the conforme portion of the letter.
On April 17, 2000, Ssangyong forwarded to MCC Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTSO401 containing the terms and conditions of the transaction. MCC sent back by fax to Ssangyong the invoice bearing the conformity signature of Chan. Payment for the ordered steel products would be made through an irrevocable letter of credit (L/C). Delivery of the goods was to be made after the L/C had been opened.
Due to MCC’s failure to put up a Letter of Credit, Ssangyong filed a civil action for damages due to breach of contracy against MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). MCC filed a Demurrer to Evidence which the court denied, ruling that the documentary evidence presented had already been admitted in the December 16, 2002 Order and their admissibility finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000.
RTC rendered its decision in favor of Ssangyong b ut it excluded Sanyo Seiki from liability for lack of competent evidence. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC but it absoled Chan of any liability. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari by MCC.
Issue:
Whether or not the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and admissible as such
Ruling:
Although the parties did not raise the question whether the original facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act (the petitioner merely assails as inadmissible evidence the photocopies of the said facsimile transmissions), we deem it appropriate to determine first whether the said fax transmissions are indeed within the coverage of R.A. No. 8792 before ruling on whether the photocopies thereof are covered by the law. In any case, this Court has ample authority to go beyond the pleadings when, in the interest of justice or for the promotion of public policy, there is a need to make its own findings in order to support its conclusions.
R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document for evidentiary purposes. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an electronic document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said Rules. An electronic document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.
Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document."
The Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 defines electronic data message and electronic document as follows:
Sec. 5. Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this Act, the following terms are defined, as follows:
xxx
c. "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means.
xxx
f. "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
When Congress formulated the term "electronic data message," it intended the same meaning as the term "electronic record" in the Canada law. This construction of the term "electronic data message," which excludes telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law's focus on "paperless" communications and the "functional equivalent approach" that it espouses. In fact, the deliberations of the Legislature are replete with discussions on paperless and digital transactions.
Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, "paperless," but verily are paper-based.
Accordingly, in an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Congress intended virtual or paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to have the same legal function as paper-based documents. Further, in a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law's definition of "electronic data message," which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with "electronic document," could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have anoriginal paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in communications and computer technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term "electronic data message."
We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmissioncannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
G.R. No. 152392; May 26, 2005
EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC., petitioner,
vs.COURT OF APPEALS and KOREAN AIRLINES, respondent.
vs.COURT OF APPEALS and KOREAN AIRLINES, respondent.
Facts:
Korean Airlines (KAL) is a corporation established and registered in the Republic of South Korea and licensed to do business in the Philippines. Its general manager in the Philippines is Suk Kyoo Kim, while its appointed counsel was Atty. Mario Aguinaldo and his law firm.
On September 6, 1999, KAL, through Atty. Aguinaldo, filed a Complaint against ETI for the collection of the principal amount of P260,150.00, plus attorney’s fees and exemplary damages. The verification and certification against forum shopping was signed by Atty. Aguinaldo.
ETI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo was not authorized to execute the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping. KAL opposed the motion, contending that Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident agent and was registered as such with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as required by the Corporation Code of the Philippines.
During the hearing of January 28, 2000, Atty. Aguinaldo claimed that he had been authorized to file the complaint through a resolution of the KAL Board of Directors approved during a special meeting held on June 25, 1999. Upon his motion, KAL was given a period of 10 days within which to submit a copy of the said resolution.
Finally, KAL submitted on March 6, 2000 an Affidavit of even date, executed by its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim, alleging that the board of directors conducted a special teleconference on June 25, 1999, which he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended. It was also averred that in that same teleconference, the board of directors approved a resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the certificate of non-forum shopping and to file the complaint. Suk Kyoo Kim also alleged, however, that the corporation had no written copy of the aforesaid resolution.
On April 12, 2000, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss, giving credence to the claims of Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim that the KAL Board of Directors indeed conducted a teleconference on June 25, 1999, during which it approved a resolution as quoted in the submitted affidavit.
ETI filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order, contending that it was inappropriate for the court to take judicial notice of the said teleconference without any prior hearing. The trial court denied the motion in its Order dated August 8, 2000.
ETI then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, assailing the orders of the RTC. In its comment on the petition, KAL appended a certificate signed by Atty. Aguinaldo.
On December 18, 2001, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition. ETI filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the CA denied. Thus, ETI, now the petitioner, comes to the Court by way of petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts may take judicial notice that business transactions maybe made by individuals through teleconferencing
Ruling:
In its April 12, 2000 Order, the RTC took judicial notice that because of the onset of modern technology, persons in one location may confer with other persons in other places, and, based on the said premise, concluded that Suk Kyoo Kim and Atty. Aguinaldo had a teleconference with the respondent’s Board of Directors in South Korea on June 25, 1999. The CA, likewise, gave credence to the respondent’s claim that such a teleconference took place, as contained in the affidavit of Suk Kyoo Kim, as well as Atty. Aguinaldo’s certification.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.
In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that business transactions may be made by individuals through teleconferencing. Teleconferencing is interactive group communication (three or more people in two or more locations) through an electronic medium. In general terms, teleconferencing can bring people together under one roof even though they are separated by hundreds of miles. This type of group communication may be used in a number of ways, and have three basic types: (1) video conferencing - television-like communication augmented with sound; (2) computer conferencing - printed communication through keyboard terminals, and (3) audio-conferencing-verbal communication via the telephone with optional capacity for telewriting or telecopying.
A teleconference represents a unique alternative to face-to-face (FTF) meetings.
In the Philippines, teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of board of directors of private corporations is a reality, in light of Republic Act No. 8792. The Securities and Exchange Commission issued SEC Memorandum Circular No. 15, on November 30, 2001, providing the guidelines to be complied with related to such conferences. Thus, the Court agrees with the RTC that persons in the Philippines may have a teleconference with a group of persons in South Korea relating to business transactions or corporate governance.
Even given the possibility that Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim participated in a teleconference along with the respondent’s Board of Directors, the Court is not convinced that one was conducted; even if there had been one, the Court is not inclined to believe that a board resolution was duly passed specifically authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute the required certification against forum shopping.
The records show that the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the respondent failed to comply with Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The respondent opposed the motion on December 1, 1999, on its contention that Atty. Aguinaldo, its resident agent, was duly authorized to sue in its behalf. The respondent, however, failed to establish its claim that Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident agent in the Philippines. Even the identification card of Atty. Aguinaldo which the respondent appended to its pleading merely showed that he is the company lawyer of the respondent’s Manila Regional Office.
The respondent, through Atty. Aguinaldo, announced the holding of the teleconference only during the hearing of January 28, 2000; Atty. Aguinaldo then prayed for ten days, or until February 8, 2000, within which to submit the board resolution purportedly authorizing him to file the complaint and execute the required certification against forum shopping. The court granted the motion. The respondent, however, failed to comply, and instead prayed for 15 more days to submit the said resolution, contending that it was with its main office in Korea. The court granted the motion per its Order dated February 11, 2000. The respondent again prayed for an extension within which to submit the said resolution, until March 6, 2000. It was on the said date that the respondent submitted an affidavit of its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim, stating, inter alia, that he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended the said teleconference on June 25, 1999, where the Board of Directors supposedly approved the following resolution.
But then, in the same affidavit, Suk Kyoo Kim declared that the respondent "do[es] not keep a written copy of the aforesaid Resolution" because no records of board resolutions approved during teleconferences were kept. This belied the respondent’s earlier allegation in its February 10, 2000 motion for extension of time to submit the questioned resolution that it was in the custody of its main office in Korea. The respondent gave the trial court the impression that it needed time to secure a copy of the resolution kept in Korea, only to allege later (via the affidavit of Suk Kyoo Kim) that it had no such written copy. Moreover, Suk Kyoo Kim stated in his affidavit that the resolution was embodied in the Secretary’s/Resident Agent’s Certificate signed by Atty. Aguinaldo. However, no such resolution was appended to the said certificate.
The petition is granted. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is ordered to dismiss, without prejudice, the complaint of the respondent.
G.R. No. 170338; December 23, 2008
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,
vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.
vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 179275; December 23, 2008
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,
vs.THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.
vs.THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors
Facts:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.
During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House.
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons.
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose.
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci tapes" abruptly stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a privilege speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public "the whole unvarnished truth – the what’s, when’s, where’s, who’s and why’s" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.
In the Senate’s plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes.
In the Senate’s plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes.
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.
Issue:
Whether or not the Senate can be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure
Ruling:
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
U.S. Supreme Court
Diamond , Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks
Vs.
Diehr and Lutton, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)
Argued October 14, 1980.
Decided March 3, 1981.
Decided March 3, 1981.
Facts:
Respondents filed a patent application claiming invention for a process for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products. The process uses a mold for precisely shaping the uncured material under heat and pressure and then curing the synthetic rubber in the mold so that the product will retain its shape and bu functionally operative after the molding is completed.
Respondents claim that their process ensures the production of molded articles which are properly cured. Achievig the perfect cure depends upon several factors including the thickness of the article to be molded, the temperature of the molding process, and the amount of time that the article is allowed to remain in the press.
While it was possible, by using well-known time, temperature, and cure relationships, to calculate by means of an established mathematical equation when to open the molding press and remove the cured product, according to respondents, the industry had not been able to measure precisely the temperature inside the press, thus making it difficult to make the necessary computations to determine the proper cure time.
Respondents characterized their contribution to the art to reside in the process of constantly measuring the temperature inside the mold and feeding the temperature measurements into a computer which repeatedly recalculates the cure time by use of the Arrhenius equation. When the recalculated time equals the actual time that has elapsed nsince the press was closed, the computer signals a device to open the press.
Respondents claim that the continuous measuring of the temperature inside the mold cavity, and the signaling by the computer to open the press, are all new in the art.
The patent examiner rejected respondents' claims on the ground that they were drawn to nonstatutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101, which provides for the issuance of patents to "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof . . . ."
The Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals agreedbwith the examiner , but the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed.
Issue:
Whether or not a process for curing synthetic rubber which includes in several of its steps the use of a mathematical formula and a programmed digital computer is patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. Section 101
Ruling:
35 U.S.C. 101 provides:
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 6 [450 U.S. 175, 182]
In cases of statutory construction, we begin with the language of the statute. Unless otherwise defined, "words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning," Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979), and, in dealing with the patent laws, we have more than once cautioned that "courts `should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed.'" Diamond v. Chakrabarty, supra, at 308, quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933).
The Patent Act of 1793 defined statutory subject matter as "any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement [thereof]." Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1, 1 Stat. 318. Not until the patent laws were recodified in 1952 did Congress replace the word "art" with the word "process." It is that latter word which we confront today, and in order to determine its meaning, we may not be unmindful of the Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act which inform us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to "include anything under the sun that is made by man." S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952).
A "process" is "an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing. If new and useful, it is just as patentable as is a piece of machinery. . . . The machinery pointed out as suitable to perform the process may or may not be new or patentable." Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 . Industrial processes such as respondents' claims for transforming raw, uncured synthetic rubber into a different state or thing are the types which have historically been eligible to receive patent-law protection.
While a mathematical formula, like a law of nature, cannot be the subject of a patent, respondents do not seek to patent a mathematical formula, but instead seek protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber. Although their process employs a well-known mathematical equation, they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation, except in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process. A claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital computer. Respondents' claims must be considered as a whole, it being inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis. The questions of whether a particular invention meets the "novelty" requirements of 35 U.S.C. 102 or the "nonobviousness" requirements of 103 do not affect the determination of whether the invention falls into a category of subject matter that is eligible for patent protection under 101.
When a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies the formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e. g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies 101's requirements.
G.R. No. 164273; March 28, 2007
EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, Petitioner,
vs.CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines), Respondent.
vs.CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines), Respondent.
Facts:
Emmanuel B. Aznar (Aznar), a known businessman in Cebu, is a holder of a Preferred Master Credit Card (Mastercard) bearing number 5423-3920-0786-7012 issued by Citibank with a credit limit of P150,000.00. As he and his wife, Zoraida, planned to take their two grandchildren, Melissa and Richard Beane, on an Asian tour, Aznar made a total advance deposit of P485,000.00 with Citibank with the intention of increasing his credit limit toP635,000.00.
With the use of his Mastercard, Aznar purchased plane tickets to Kuala Lumpur for his group worth P237,000.00. On July 17, 1994, Aznar, his wife and grandchildren left Cebu for the said destination.
Aznar claims that when he presented his Mastercard in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the same was not honored. And when he tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for the reason that his card was blacklisted by Citibank. Such dishonor forced him to buy the tickets in cash. He further claims that his humiliation caused by the denial of his card was aggravated when Ingtan Agency spoke of swindlers trying to use blacklisted cards.
On August 26, 1994, Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank claiming that Citibank fraudulently or with gross negligence blacklisted his Mastercard which forced him, his wife and grandchildren to abort important tour destinations and prevented them from buying certain items in their tour. He further claimed that he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, besmirched reputation and social humiliation due to the wrongful blacklisting of his card. To prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar presented a computer print-out, denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency (Exh. "G") with the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi) which shows that his card in question was "DECL OVERLIMIT" or declared over the limit.
Citibank denied the allegation that it blacklisted Aznar’s card. To prove that they did not blacklist Aznar’s card, Citibank’s Credit Card Department Head, Dennis Flores, presented Warning Cancellation Bulletins which contained the list of its canceled cards covering the period of Aznar’s trip.
The Reginal Trial Court dismissed Aznar’s complaint. In his motion for reconsideration, however, Judge De la Peña ruled, among others, that Exh. "G" can be received as prima facie evidence of the dishonor of Aznar’s Mastercard.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals granted Citibank’s appeal and ruled, among others, that Exh. "G" is an electronic document which must be authenticated pursuant to Section 2, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, or under Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court by anyone who saw the document executed or written; Aznar, however, failed to prove the authenticity of Exh. "G", thus it must be excluded. Hence this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the online authorization foreign account activity report, a computer print-out handed to Aznar to prove that his Mastercard was dishonored for being blacklisted, is an electronic evidence and is admissible in evidence
Ruling:
Aznar puts much weight on the ON-LINE AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, a computer print-out handed to Aznar by Ingtan Agency, marked as Exh. "G", to prove that his Mastercard was dishonored for being blacklisted. On said print-out appears the words "DECL OVERLIMIT" opposite Account No. 5423-3920-0786-7012.
As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit cannot be considered admissible as its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently established by petitioner.
The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. "G," did not actually see the document executed or written, neither was he able to provide evidence on the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said computer print-out.
Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on August 1, 2001, and which is being invoked by Aznar in this case, the authentication of Exh. "G" would still be found wanting.
Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:
Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
Between said computer print out (Exhibit ‘G’) and the Warning Cancellation Bulletins (Exhibits ‘3’ to ‘8’ and their submarkings) the latter documents adduced by defendant are entitled to greater weight than that said computer print out presented by plaintiff that bears on the issue of whether the plaintiff’s preferred master card was actually placed in the ‘hot list’ or blacklisted for the following reasons:
The first reason is that the due execution and authentication of these Warning Cancellation Bulletins (or WCB) have been duly established and identified by defendant’s own witness, Dennis Flores, one of the bank’s officers, who is the head of its credit card department, and, therefore, competent to testify on the said bulletins as having been issued by the defendant bank showing that plaintiff’s preferred master credit card was never blacklisted or placed in the Bank’s ‘hot list’. But on the other hand, plaintiff’s computer print out (Exhibit ‘G’) was never authenticated or its due execution had never been duly established.
G.R. No. 182835; April 20, 2010
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,
vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.
vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.
Facts:
complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A). The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B).
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter."
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an expert in information technology and computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible for one to lift the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it on the body of another woman in another picture. Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by computer to make it appear that the face and the body belonged to just one person.
Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct irregularities: the face was not proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was fake and the face on it had been copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales explained how this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to a cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.
Issue:
Whether or not thr RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene oicture presented in the case
Ruling:
Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him without any warrant, the evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact is that the prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial conference.
Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish’s testimony that she received the obscene picture and malicious text messages that the sender’s cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did. Consequently, the prosecution did not have to present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those messages.
Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish. His defense was that he himself received those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing Irish and he merely forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to authenticate the same. The RTC did not give credence to such version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was most unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the sender.
Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
